Terrorists crashed a truck loaded with explosives through the perimeter of the Marine Battalion headquarters building at the Beirut Airport, killing 241 Marines. No one attempted, or was able, to stop the truck because, under the rules of engagement as the command understood them, sentries had no automatic or heavy weapons at their posts and they carried unloaded M16s.
But several weeks earlier, the President had changed the rules of engagement to allow the Marines to initiate stronger measures for self-defense. Unfortunately, as that directive went through multiple layers in the chain of command, its intent was reversed, and the Marines on the scene believed they had in fact been ordered to remain in a "peacetime" mode. As described by former SecNav John F. Lehman in his book, Command of the Seas (1988) (pp. 322-23):
"[T]he September 12 directive ... went from the president to the secretary of defense; from the secretary of defense through the JCS and their seventeen-hundred man staff; to CINCLANT and CINCLANTFLT and Fleet Marine Force Atlantic in Norfolk for coordination; from the JCS organization thence to the European theater commander in Belgium; from Belgium to the Deputy European Command headquarters in Stuttgart; from Stuttgart to the commander of U.S. naval forces, Europe, in Naples; from Naples to the deputy NAVEUR headquarters in London; from London to the U.S. Sixth Fleet command headquarters in Gaeta, Italy; from Gaeta back to the U.S. commander, Task Force 60, in Naples; from Naples to the U.S. commander, Task Force 61, off Beirut; and from CTF-61 ashore to CTF-62, Colonel Geraghty, in command of the marines. The [blue-ribbon investigative] commission documented how in whispering-down-the-lane fashion the chain of command simply neutralized the impact of the September 12 message by reminding the marines later that the mission and the ROE had not changed."
As you work on your taskers, remember: Words matter. Accuracy counts. Understand what you're doing. Get it right.
But several weeks earlier, the President had changed the rules of engagement to allow the Marines to initiate stronger measures for self-defense. Unfortunately, as that directive went through multiple layers in the chain of command, its intent was reversed, and the Marines on the scene believed they had in fact been ordered to remain in a "peacetime" mode. As described by former SecNav John F. Lehman in his book, Command of the Seas (1988) (pp. 322-23):
"[T]he September 12 directive ... went from the president to the secretary of defense; from the secretary of defense through the JCS and their seventeen-hundred man staff; to CINCLANT and CINCLANTFLT and Fleet Marine Force Atlantic in Norfolk for coordination; from the JCS organization thence to the European theater commander in Belgium; from Belgium to the Deputy European Command headquarters in Stuttgart; from Stuttgart to the commander of U.S. naval forces, Europe, in Naples; from Naples to the deputy NAVEUR headquarters in London; from London to the U.S. Sixth Fleet command headquarters in Gaeta, Italy; from Gaeta back to the U.S. commander, Task Force 60, in Naples; from Naples to the U.S. commander, Task Force 61, off Beirut; and from CTF-61 ashore to CTF-62, Colonel Geraghty, in command of the marines. The [blue-ribbon investigative] commission documented how in whispering-down-the-lane fashion the chain of command simply neutralized the impact of the September 12 message by reminding the marines later that the mission and the ROE had not changed."
As you work on your taskers, remember: Words matter. Accuracy counts. Understand what you're doing. Get it right.
